

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

STAT

14 Feb 85

Executive Registry

85- 494/1

Memo For  CIA


STAT

Dear

Here's a copy of our most recent draft agenda.

Its subject to change by the Commission Chairman (as yet unnamed) and by speaker availability.

We will keep you informed of changes.

  
Captain Joe Northrop

Chemical Warfare Review Commission

GPO : 1984 O - 447-393



273

**DRAFT**

**14 FEB 1985**

**TASK 1**

**DAY 1 (OPEN MEETING DAY - Multiple Locations)**

**OPENING SECTION**

0900-0915 Charge to the Commission. Present the administration intent in forming the CWRC. (President)

0915-1015 Opening Statement. Administration position on Chemical Warfare. (Secretary Weinberger)

1015-1030 Break

1030-1200 Congressional Perspective. The sense of the congress in writing Section 1511 of PL 98-525. (Senator John Warner - 45 minutes) (Congressman Sam Stratton - 45 minutes)

1200-1300 Executive Session/Working Luncheon. Receive guidance and tasks from the Chairman. (Chairman)

**TUTORIAL SECTION**

1300-1400 Issue of Protective Clothing and Masks. Commission will be fitted out with protective masks and clothing. (Army)

1400-1730

What is Chemical Warfare. The nature of chemical agents, their use on the battlefield, degradation incurred and countermeasures required resulting from their employment and current tactical defensive and retaliatory capability. (Representatives from Army, Navy and Air Force)

DAY 2

(CLOSED MEETING DAY)

TUTORIAL (CONT)

0730-0800      Travel to Briefing site

0815-1615      The Threat We Face. (Closed Meeting) Tactical and Strategic threat posed by Warsaw Pact and Third World country capabilities - current and projected (Coordinated by Mr. David Lowe, National Intelligence Center)

- Overview (William Casey, Director of Central Intelligence - 30 min) (C)

- ACSI (Gen Odom - out Chief of Staff for Intelligence - 1½hrs) (C)

- DIA (General Williams - 1½hrs) (C)

- Dr. Allen S. Rehm, "Soviet Capabilities and Doctrine for Chemical Warfare" - (45 min) (U)

- Yossef Bodarsky, "Soviet Chemical Warfare Doctrine and Operational Act" - (45 min) (U)

- Iraq/Iran. Report on the           date           UN verification trip. (Dr. Peter Dunn-Australia - 1hr) (U)

- Arkady Shevchenko (Former Soviet Ambassador to the  
United Nations - 1 hr (U))

1615-1715      Travel to Matomic Building

DAY 3

(OPEN MEETING DAY)

0800-0830 Travel to briefing site

0830-1430 National Policy Dealing with Chemical Warfare. The principles and roles of deterrence. The context of deterrence; conventional, chemical and nuclear.

- Overview (Robert C. McFarlane, National Security Advisor to the President, 45- min)
- US and NATO (State Department, 1 hour)
- Arms Control (3 hours - Adelman, Department, ACDA)

1430-1515 Ground travel to Andrews AFB

1515-1645 Air Travel to Army Installation.

1645-1800 Open

1830- Dinner and Introduction to the installation.

TUTORIAL (CONT)

Day 4 (OPEN MEETING DEPENDENT ON OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS)

0900 Observation and Participation in Field Training.

Observe and experience the peculiarities and debilitating effects of chemical warfare on Army operations. (Army)

1530 Air Travel to Air Force Installation

Open

Dinner and Introduction to the installation

DAY 5 (OPEN MEETING DEPENDENT ON OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS)

0900 Observation and Participation in Air Base Operations

Observe and experience the peculiarities and debilitating effects of Chemical Warfare on Air Force operations.

1530-1700 Air Travel to Andrews Air Force Base

1700-1730 Ground travel to Matomic Building

Day 6

PERSPECTIVES (OPEN MEETING - MATOMIC BUILDING)

0800-0930 History of Chemical Warfare. Brief history of chemical warfare use; antiquity, World War I, Ethiopia, World War II, Yemen, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Laos/Kampuchea and Iran/Iraq War.

- Antiquity through WWI (Mrs. Gay Hammerman)

- World War II (Professor John Ellis Van Courtland Moon)

- Post World War II (Mrs. Amoretta Hoeber, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research Development and Systems)

0930-1000 Travel to briefing site

1000-1100 Future Implications of Technology on the Issue.  
(Closed Meeting)

Possibility of emerging technology to significantly influence defensive and retaliatory capabilities in the near term. (Dr. John Deutch, Dean of Science MIT)

1100-1200 Lunch

1200-1600 Military Perspective (CLOSED MEETING)



- Balance of Forces

(OJCS)(General John Vessey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)

- The imbalance of chemical capabilities and its impact on current military policy and future war planning. The capability of meeting the CW threat with conventional and nuclear forces.

1600-1630      Travel to Matomic Building

Day 7 & 8

(OPEN MEETING - MATOMIC BUILDING)

Policy Implications

Deterrence through defense only

(J. Perry Robinson - min)

(Col Charles H. Bay - min)

Deterrence through nuclear forces

(J. Perry Robinson min)

(Amoretta M. Hoeber min)

--Impact of CW policy on alliance relationships

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

--Arms control prospects

( \_\_\_\_\_ )

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EKDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	NIO/NP	X			
20	C/ACIS		X		
21	D/OSWR		X		
22	D/OIA		X		
SUSPENSE		1600, 15 Feb 85			
		Date			

Remarks To # 19: Pls take the lead in providing Coordinated response direct to LTC Sisti. (Also pls provide copy to ES)

Executive Secretary

11 Feb 85

Date

3637 (10-81)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Executive Order
85- 494

7 FEB 1985

Honorable William J. Casey  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20501

Dear Bill:

The Executive Order, 12502, signed on 28 January 1985, established the bipartisan "Chemical Warfare Review Commission" which was required by the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985. The purpose of the Commission is to review national policy and programs for deterring chemical warfare. In their review the Commission will be tasked to provide sequential reports on basic issues by 1 April 1985. If the Commission agrees with the Administration's logic, then the three issues to be addressed will be:

1. Task Number 1: Should the United States continue to have a chemical retaliatory capability and chemical defense to deter chemical, biological and toxin attacks against the U.S. and its allies?

2. Task Number 2: If the Commission finds that the United States should continue to maintain a chemical retaliatory capability to deter chemical attack, is the current U.S. chemical stockpile sufficient for that purpose and, in particular, is the current U.S. chemical stockpile of unitary chemical weapons a credible deterrent to the Soviet Union's use of chemical weapons against the United States and its allies?

3. Task Number 3: If the Commission determines that chemical weapons are the best means of deterring chemical warfare and that the current United States stockpile is, or will become insufficient for this purpose, what should be done?

I believe that the Commission could perform a salutary service by acting as the catalyst needed to form the national consensus necessary to reestablish a credible deterrent capability. I solicit your support in this effort to ensure that the Commission receives the appropriate information in the chemical warfare arena. I have also sent this letter to the Secretary of State and the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Commission Chairman and members are expected to be named by the President soon. I believe that such a Commission, made up of prominent national leaders, deserves first hand information


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from principal Administration leaders. The Commission's proposed activities are addressed in the attached Charter, draft agenda and tentative schedule. Request that you review the draft and forward any recommendations for appropriate modifications not later than 15 February 1985.

Point of contact is LTC Frank Sisti, Staff Manager, Presidential Review Commission on Chemical Warfare Deterrence, 695-1097.

Sincerely,

  
William H. Taft, IV  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachments

**CHARTER**  
**CHEMICAL WARFARE REVIEW COMMISSION**

**Section 1. Official Designation**

The official designation of this Board shall be the Chemical Warfare Review Commission, chartered and established pursuant to Section 1511 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, Pub.L. No. 98-525, and Section 9(c) of Public Law 92-463, as amended, and Executive Order 12502.

**Section 2. Membership**

The Commission shall be composed of no more than nine members including a Chairman appointed or designated by the President. The membership shall be bipartisan and will consist of distinguished citizens who can represent a broad spectrum of public interests and concerns.

**Section 3. Background and Objective**

United States policy regarding chemical weapons is to seek a complete and verifiable ban on their development, production, stockpiling and transfer. Until such a ban is achieved, however, it is U.S. policy to deter a chemical attack against the United States and its allies. Such deterrence is now perceived to require both a protective capability which allows survival and minimum degradation of sustained operations of our forces in a chemical environment, and a credible chemical retaliatory capability.

It is the President's view that the national security of the United States would benefit from clear, definitive judgments from this bipartisan Commission comprised of distinguished American citizens. Governmental and public deliberations of chemical warfare issues during past Administrations have not yielded the consensus necessary to implement fully current U.S. chemical warfare policy or, alternatively, to determine a new policy. It is the President's hope that informed and impartial judgments from this Commission will break the current stalemate regarding these important issues and allow us to continue to deter chemical warfare while we pursue comprehensive chemical arms control.

Therefore, and in accordance with Section 1511 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, the Commission shall review the overall adequacy of the chemical warfare posture of the United States with particular emphasis on the question of whether the United States should produce binary chemical munitions, and shall report its findings and recommendations to the President not later than April 1, 1985.

#### Section 4. Commission Tasks and Reports

In obtaining the above objective, the Commission is provided guidance in the form of three tasks with three sequential reports.

1. The Commission is to determine whether the United States should continue to have a chemical retaliatory capability as well as a chemical defense capability to deter chemical and biological and toxin attacks against the U.S. and its allies. If such continued policy is not justified, the Commission should specify -- in the absence of a chemical retaliatory capability -- whether the U.S. should begin to rely on: (a) conventional capabilities and chemical defense; (b) nuclear capabilities and chemical defense; (c) some other mix of military capabilities. This judgment should consider the nature of deterrence itself, the related force balance (conventional, chemical and nuclear), the ability of defensive measures alone to meet the Soviet chemical warfare threat, and the adequacy of funding for current and projected defensive measure programs. It should also consider the peculiar nature of chemical warfare as reflected in the history of chemical weapons use in the 20th Century, the role of chemical weapons in maintaining overall deterrence and operational military capabilities, and the role of a chemical retaliatory capability in arms control efforts.

The Commission's judgments and supporting rationale are to be reported to the President of the United States by 15 February 1985.

2. If the Commission concludes in Task 1 above that the United States should continue to maintain a chemical retaliatory capability to deter chemical attack, the Commission is to determine whether the current U.S. chemical stockpile is sufficient for that purpose, and, in particular, the adequacy of the existing United States stockpile of unitary chemical weapons in providing a credible deterrent to use by the Soviet Union of chemical weapons against United States and allied forces. Will it be sufficient in the future for the period extending to the year 2000? Judgments by the Commission concerning the sufficiency of the current (and future) chemical stockpile should start by taking into account stated military requirements and the nature of the military threat, but are not limited to these factors. Obsolescence, deterioration, weapons safety and security, should also be considered, including what levels of deterrence are provided by bulk agent and chemical weapons under alternative deployment options. The Commission shall particularly consider the relationship of chemical stockpile modernization by the United States with the ultimate goal of the United States of achieving a multi-lateral, comprehensive, and verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

The Commission judgments and supporting rationale are to be completed and results reported to the President of the United States by 1 March 1985.

3. Where appropriate, based upon the Commission's prior judgments, the Commission will provide judgment on the following:

3(a). If the Commission determines in Task 1 that a chemical retaliatory capability is needed to deter chemical warfare, and in Task 2 that the current U.S. stockpile is or will become insufficient for this purpose, what should be done? Should additional unitary munitions be produced, and if so, of what type(s)? Should separated component or "binary" weapons be produced, and if so, of what type(s)? What other alternatives are available? In particular, is the binary chemical modernization program proposed by the Department of Defense adequate to support United States national security policy by posing a credible deterrent to chemical warfare?

3(b). If the Commission concludes in Task 1 that a chemical retaliatory capability is needed to deter chemical warfare, and in Task 2 that the current U.S. stockpile is sufficient for this purpose, what, if anything, needs to be done to maintain this sufficiency in the future, or at least out to the year 2000?

3(c). If the Commission concludes in Task 1 that a chemical retaliatory capability is not needed to deter chemical warfare, what should be done with the current U.S. chemical stockpile? If a decision is made to demilitarize some or all of the weapons, at what rate should it occur? To what extent should we delay demilitarization to provide leverage in arms control negotiations?

The Commission's judgments and supporting rationale are to be reported to the President of the United States by 15 March 1985.

#### Section 5. Support Services

The heads of Executive agencies, to the extent permitted by law, shall provide the Commission such information as it may require for the purpose of carrying out its functions. The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Commission with such administrative services, facilities, staff and other support services as may be necessary. Any expenses of the Commission shall be paid from funds as may be available to the Secretary of Defense.



#### Section 6. Federal Advisory Committee Act

Notwithstanding any other Executive Order, the functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, except that of reporting to the Congress, which are applicable to the Commission, shall be performed by the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General Services.

#### Section 7. Estimated Costs

Members of the Commission shall serve without any compensation for their work on the Commission. However, they shall be entitled to travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the Government service (5 U.S.C. 5701-5707), to the extent funds are available therefor.

The estimated annual cost for supporting the Commission including travel expenses and per diem, in lieu of subsistence, is \$195,000, and is expected to involve seven man-years of effort.

#### Section 8. Meetings and Termination Date

The Commission will meet at the call of the Chairman.

The Commission is expected to meet approximately ten days each month from February 1985 through April 1985. Should the Commission determine that the tasks cannot be completed as scheduled, the President and the Secretary of Defense shall be notified as early as possible. In any case, the Commission will terminate 30 days after its final report is completed, or by 30 September 1985, whichever date is earlier.

FILED this 28th day of January 1985.

**DRAFT AGENDA**

**PRESIDENTIAL CHEMICAL**

**WARFARE REVIEW COMMISSION**

## TASK 1

TIME DAY 1: Tuesday, February 19, 1985

Charge to the Commission. Presented by Robert McFarlane,  
National Security Advisor to the President. (Unclassified)

to Opening Statement (Administration position given by Richard  
L. Wagner, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense  
(Atomic Energy) (Unclassified)

to Introduction to CW: Overview of U.S. Chemical Posture

(a) The principles and roles of deterrence (Unclassified)

to (b) The context of deterrence; balance of forces;  
conventional, chemical and nuclear (Unclassified)

(c) Congressional Perspective

1. Congressman Les Aspin

2. Senator John Warner

### \*Possible presenters

1. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and

Possible Presenters

1. Mrs. Gay Hammerman, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO), "Implications of the History of Chemical Warfare for a Hypothetical Chemical/Conventional War in the late 1980's.

2. Professor John Ellis Van Courtland Moon, Department of History, Fitchburg State College, "Chemical Weapons and Deterrence: The World War II Experience".

3. Ms. Amoretta Hoeber, Principal Deputy and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for RD&S.

to Military Advantages: Why chemical weapons are used on the modern battlefield - perceived military advantages and disadvantages of CW vis-a-vis other weapons systems (including biological offensive and defensive force degradation as a result of cumbersome equipment and resultant heat stresses, communications problems, psychological stress, etc.) (Unclassified - Part 1)

Possible Presenters

1. Lieutenant General Carl Cathi, USAFE

2. General Frederick J. Kroesen, USA, (ret.) to present the "Kroesen Report"

4

3. Major General Klein, JCS

to Biotechnology: The implications of new developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering. (Unclassified)

Possible Presenters:

1. Dr. Joshua Lederberg
2. Dr. Calvin McLaughlin, University of California, Irvine, "The implications of recent advances in molecular biology for chemical warfare.
3. Dr. Beisel, Special Assistant to the Surgeon General for Biotechnology.

DAY 3 Thursday-Friday, February 21-22, 1985  
Field trip to Fort Benning, Georgia. Remain overnight.  
(Potentially Ft. Bragg/Camp Lejeune)

DAY 4 Monday, February 25, 1985 (4 Mar)

Current policies regarding chemical and biological warfare.

to U.S. and NATO (Unclassified)

Possible Presenters

1. George Schultz, Secretary of State

5

2. Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

3. Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary (International Security Policy)

4. Robert C. McFarlane

5. Dr. Theodore Gold, former Deputy Assistant Secretary (Chemical Matters)

to NATO and other U.S. alliances (Classified)  
Detailed briefing to be presented during European trip.

Possible Presenters

1. Lord Carrington

2. Joseph Luns

3. General Bernard Rogers and his NATO deputies (SACEUR)

4. Admiral Crowe (CINCPAC)

5. David<sup>1</sup> Abshire, U.S. Ambassador to NATO

to United Nations

Possible Presenter

1. Ambassador Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick

to Review of C/BW arms control efforts (Unclassified)

1. Pre-World War I

6

2. Geneva Protocol (1925)
3. Biological weapons convention (1972)
4. U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks on a comprehensive CW ban
5. Multilateral talks on comprehensive CW ban (ongoing)
6. Enduring problems and new threats, including verification, proliferation, and biotechnology/genetic engineering
7. Relationship between CW talks and nuclear weapons talks (INF, START, etc.)

Possible Presenters

1. Kenneth Adelman, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (for items 1-3, 6, 7)
2. Donald Lowitz, current CD Ambassador (for items, 4, 5)
3. Allied or Third World member of CD
4. Louis Fields, former CD Ambassador

to Report on verification trip to Iraq/Iran (Unclassified)

Possible Presenter

1. Dr. Peter Dunn (Australia)

DAY 5 Tuesday, February 26, 1985 (5 Mar)

to World Stockpiles. Description of current world

conventional, chemical and nuclear stockpiles and capabilities, including defensive capabilities.

(Classified)

Possible Presenters:

1. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy
2. Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense
3. Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State
4. General John Vessey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
5. Ambassador Seymour Weiss
6. Robert C. McFarlane, National Security Advisor to the President

to Assymetries. Examples and implications of assymetries in conventional, chemical and nuclear capabilities and stockpiles. (Classified)

Possible presenters

1. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy
2. Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense
3. Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State
4. General John Vessey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
5. Ambassador Seymour Weiss



8

6. Robert C. McFarlane, National Security Advisor to the  
President

to CW Delivery Systems. Description of chemical weapons  
delivery systems, weapons effects, and defensive systems  
(including films/tapes of U.S. and foreign systems)  
(Classified)

Possible Presenter

1. Major General Al Nord

to Military Advantages. Classified portion of Military  
Advantages presented Day 2.

Possible Presenter

1. Dr. Theodore Gold, former Deputy Assistant Secretary  
(Chemical Matters)

2. General Frederick J. Kroesen, USA, (ret.) to present the  
"Kroesen Report"

3. Major General Klein, JCS

4. General William Depuy (ret.)

DAY 6      Wednesday, February 27 1985 (6 Mar)

All day The CW/BW threat worldwide including proliferation presen-

All day      The CW/BW threat worldwide including proliferation  
presen-      issues (intelligence briefing) (Classified)  
tation

Possible Presenters

1. William Casey, Director of Central Intelligence
2. Davis Lowe, CIA
3. General Williams, DIA
4. Dr. Allan S. Rehm, Foreign Systems Research Center, SAI,  
"Soviet Capabilities and Doctrine for Chemical Warfare"  
(Unclassified)
5. Yossef Bodansky, "Soviet Chemical Warfare Doctrine and  
Operational Art" (Unclassified)

DAY 7      Thursday, February 28, 1985 (7 Mar)

All day      Conflicting views of deterrence in Chemical Warfare.  
Presen-      (Unclassified)  
tation

- Deterrence through defense only (J. Perry Robinson)
- Deterrence insufficient through defense only (COL Charles  
H. Bay)
- Nuclear deterrence sufficient to deter CW use (J. Perry  
Robinson)

10

- Problems with reliance on nuclear deterrence (Amoretta M. Hoeber)

Possible Presenters

1. Dr. Victor Utgoff, Institute for Defense Analyses
2. Major Charles E. Heller, USAR, Combat Studies
3. T. N. Dupuy, Col, USA (Ret), President, HERO
4. Dr. John Ellis Van Courtland Moon
5. Ms. Amoretta Hoeber
6. Dr. Theodore Gold, former Deputy Assistant Secretary (Chemical Matters)

TASK 1 report due by 22 March 1985 (29 Mar). Before start of Task 2, Commission is scheduled for a field trip to Europe, Sunday, 2 March-Saturday 9 March (9-17 Mar). Trip to include:

U.S. forces

West Germany

NATO/Belgium

France

United Kingdom

During the week of 18 March (25 March), the Commission is scheduled to go to the Naval War College for war game activities. Length of stay will be 2 days. POC is Major Doug Schultz.

TASK 2

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DAY 1            Monday, April 1, 1985 (8 Apr)

to            Presentation of qualitative and quantitative military requirements by CINCs, JCS. Discussion of the issue of the level of deterrence provided by the current stockpile. (This will address deterrence factors provided by bulk agents and chemical weapons not deployed. (Classified))

Possible Presenters

1. General John W. Vessey, Chairman, JCS
2. Major General William E. Klein, J-5, to discuss Employment and Doctrine.
3. Major Alan G. Smith, J-5, Nuclear Chemical Division
4. General Bernard Rogers (SACEUR) (while in Europe)
5. General William Depuy (ret)
6. Col Lynn, JCHEMA, to discuss current testing results

to            Report on the condition of the Stockpile, Including the number of munitions and the number of usable munitions. This will also include a discussion of the projected life of the existing CW Stockpile. (Calculate the expected deterioration of munitions now in service through the year 2000). (Classified)

12

Possible Presenters

1. Dr. John L. Margrave, Chairman, Stockpile Review Commission
2. Professor L. B. Rogers
3. Dr. Melvin Calvin
4. Dr. John Baldeschweiler

to Discussion of the safety and security issues concerning the stockpile. To include storage concerns, the value of bulk of agent and the threat of maximum credible events.  
(Classified)

Possible Presenter

1. DDESB Chairman, Capt Powell
2. Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition

DAY 2            Tuesday, April 2, 1985 (9 Apr)

Half Day        Computer Simulations. Review of computer simulations  
Presen-        and war games with respect to munitions use in  
tation        Chemical Warfare (IDA and other studies).  
(Classified)

Possible Presenters

1. Major Doug Schultz

13

2. Ed Kerlin, IDA

DAY 3            Wednesday, April 3, 1985 (10 Apr)

All Day

Presentation    Other Points of View. (Unclassified)

- Today's stockpile is sufficient
- The use of "token" CW munitions
- The relationship between modernization and arms control agreements.

Possible Presenters

1. Senator Gary Hart (Colorado)
2. Senator David Pryor (Arkansas)
3. Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder (Colorado)
4. Congressman Robert Kastenmeyer (Wisconsin)
5. Ed Bethune - former Congressman from Arkansas
6. Matthew Meselson
7. J. Perry Robinson
8. Saul Hormats

DAYS 4&5        Thursday, Friday, April 4-5 (11-12 Apr)

Field trip to a chemical storage site, Pine Bluff, Arkansas

14

NOTE: Monday, April 15, 1985 (22 Apr)

Report due on Task 2 for Presidential review

### TASK 3

Week of 15 April 1985 (22 Apr)

Weapons Systems Effectiveness and Safety. Discussion of various weapons systems (i.e., basics of how unitary and binary weapons work). Discuss military effectiveness and operational safety.

DoD Binary Program. Status of DoD Binary Program, including developmental test results of the Bigeye Program, facilitization and production plans - cost and other impact of producing unitary munitions.

#### Public Comment on the DoD Binary Program

##### Possible Presenters

1. BG Davis
2. Bob Orton
3. Amy Hoeber
4. Dr. Bill Richardson (CRDC)
5. Bill Lee (CRDC)

#### Brief Background on Demilitarization



16

- demilitarization technology and costs
- status of demilitarization programs and schedules
- impact of demilitarization on Arms Control (e.g., the use of another demonstration effort at Tooele, Utah)

Possible Presenters

1. Members of DoD Demilitarization Management Committee and DoD official involved in demilitarization.
2. COL Pete Hidalgo (Commander USATHAMA)

Tuesday, April 30, 1985 (7 May)

Report due on Task 3 for Presidential review.